Professor of Law and Lecturer in Law (5-Year Post) Advertised at Dublin City University

DCU_logo 2013The School of Law and Government at Dublin City University wishes to appoint a Professor of Law and a Lecturer in Law (5-Year Post), as part of its continuing development. Both appointments will commence on 1 Sept 2013.

Further information on the Professor of Law position is available here.

Further information on the Lecturer (5-Year post) is available here.

 

Professor of Law and Lecturer in Law (5-Year Post) Advertised at Dublin City University

The Rich Legacy of Ronald Dworkin: 1931-2013

We welcome this guest post from Dr. Tom Hickey a lecturer in the School of Law at NUI Galway.  In this guest post Dr. Hickey reflects on the work of Ronald Dworkin.  Dr. Hickey lectures in the areas of constitutional law, jurisprudence and administrative law at NUI Galway.

The passing last week of Ronald Dworkin, Professor of Law at New York University and Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London, will have struck a chord with many in the academic human rights community. With contributions such as Taking Rights Seriously (1977), Law’s Empire (1986) and Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (1996), Dworkin stands amongst the most influential legal philosophers of the past few centuries. The scope of his work is considerable, but his most enduring legacy is likely to be his theory of adjudication: his account of how judges decide “hard cases.” On this question Dworkin challenged his great 20th century rival H.L.A. Hart (and Legal Positivism generally) by insisting that there is a necessary connection between law and morality. This connection, Dworkin argued, is attributable to the fact that in engaging in the process of adjudication judges necessarily draw on moral considerations. They do so not because of some irresistable impulse on their parts to change the law so that it better fits with their own moral or political tastes but rather because drawing on evaluative considerations is an unavoidable part of any interpretive enterprise, whether it be interpreting a piece of literature or art, a particular social practice, or a set of legal provisions.

Dworkin was a master of the punchy phrase or analogy. He used the image of a right as a “trump card” that automatically defeats cards from other suits as a means of explaining his account of rights as special claims that defeat ordinary political claims based on utilitarian calculations.  Similarly in respect of his argument concerning “constructive interpretation” and how judges decide cases: he frequently used productions of great plays as an illustration.

And so how do we interpret social practices or texts? Imagine you are a music teacher in a secondary school tasked with putting on a version of West Side Story. You must interpret that musical. This is quite a task, given that it is based on a book written by an author, with music written by someone else, lyrics by another, and choreogrpahy by yet another!

You would probably begin by familiarising yourself with the text and the music. You could not reasonably claim that yours was a production of West Side Story if you had instructed your actors to act lines from The Sound of Music. As well as using the text, you will probably consider previous productions of West Side Story. In fact these previous productions will heavily influence your decisions – both consciously and otherwise – as you set about your task. In other words, in putting on the production you will have fidelity to the text and music as well as to previous interpretations. Continue reading “The Rich Legacy of Ronald Dworkin: 1931-2013”

The Rich Legacy of Ronald Dworkin: 1931-2013