Call for Papers and Posters: Post-graduate Symposium on Occupation, Transitional Justice and Gender

Ulster uNiThe Transitional Justice Institute (Ulster University) and the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences (Ulster University) invite proposals for a one-day postgraduate symposium on Occupation, Transitional Justice and Gender to be held on Friday, 8 May 2015.

Keynote Speaker: Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science

Date: Friday, 8 May 2015, 09:00 – 18:30

Venue: Ulster University, York St campus (Belfast, Northern Ireland)

This symposium seeks to explore the interface between occupation, transitional justice and gender. The starting point for exploration is based in feminist concerns that are broadly focused on issues of power, control and hierarchies. More specifically, feminist theorizing acknowledges that women’s needs during times of occupation, conflict, and/or transition are often ignored, sidelined or essentialised; recent research is also looking into masculinities during these periods. While much research has explored transitional justice and gender, there has been limited research on the relationship and complexities of occupation and gender. Furthermore, there is a dearth of research on how these three concepts intersect, inform and/or impact each other. Some questions to be explored during the symposium may include: Continue reading “Call for Papers and Posters: Post-graduate Symposium on Occupation, Transitional Justice and Gender”

Call for Papers and Posters: Post-graduate Symposium on Occupation, Transitional Justice and Gender

Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: First Workshop 'The Foreign Subject'

NIFJPWe are delighted to welcome back Ruth Houghton, a Graduate Teaching Assistant and Ph.D. candidate at Durham Law School who has previously written for us here and here. Ruth is also a commentator on the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project. The post was published on Inherently Human.

The Project

As has been previously mentioned on this blog, the  Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project (@irishfjp) is led by Aoife O’Donoghue (Durham Law School), Julie McCandless (LSE Law) and Máiréad Enright (Kent Law School). A feminist judgments project writes the ‘missing feminist judgment’; it takes original decisions and rewrites them from a feminist perspective. Abiding to the strictures of precedent and custom that judges adhere to, the feminist judge shows how the law could have been interpreted or applied differently. This particular project builds on the work of the Canadian, Australian and English feminist judgments projects, and focuses specifically on the creation of identity in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The project will explore both jurisdictions, rewriting cases from both the Irish and Northern Irish courts. The Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments project explores the building of communities and the importance of diaspora for Irish identity as well as creating a space to explore the ways that Northern Irish and Irish identities have ‘affected, and defined themselves in relation to one another over time’.

First Drafting Workshop

On the 23rd October 2014, in Ulster University, five feminist judges presented their draft judgments to an interdisciplinary audience. The judges were free to choose the cases that they wanted to rewrite from a feminist perspective, which meant that there was a broad range of issues covered. From Irish constitutional law to vicarious liability for child sexual abuse, from employment law to public appointments and police powers and duties, these cases raised questions about community, identity, harm and the limitations of the legal systems.  The cases that were discussed at this workshop were; In re White (Judge: Catherine O’Rourke), McGimpsey v Ireland (Judge: Aoife O’Donoghue), In re E (Judge: Colin Murray), O’Keefe v Hickey (Judge: Maeve O’Rourke) and Flynn v Power (Judge: Eoin Daly).

Interspersed between the cases, were panels from scholars and activists from a variety of disciplines. The project aims to engage with the particular social, political and sectarian context and so issues of religion, sexuality and abortion were discussed during the two-day’ workshop. Photographer and filmmaker Emma Campbell (@frecklescorp) shared her video, When they put their hands out like scales, which includes the words from the Hansard debate on abortion in the Northern Ireland Assembly on 20th June 2000. Listening to words from the debate highlighted the prevalence of religion within the political debate on abortion. The images of walkways, paths and finally images of the docks were used to demonstrate the journeys women in Ireland have to take to seek an abortion and ultimately the denied statehood of these women. The extent to which abortion effects the construction or deconstruction of women’s identities was highlighted in the short-film as an actor read aloud Mrs Carson’s statement from the debate in the Assembly, ‘they should not be made to feel like criminals having to hide their identities. Nor should they be ostracised by society.’ Leanne McCormick demonstrated the role of female sexuality in the creation of women’s identities. She displayed images from ‘douching’ advertisements and told of how women were represented within trial reports from the early 20th century following accusations of abortions, attempted terminations and infanticide.

The construction of the foreign subject

The theme of the first drafting workshop was the ‘Foreign Subject’. Ex-President of the United States of American, Bill Clinton was noted to have said that ‘the most urgent issue facing the world [is] that of identity’ (quoted by Marianne Elliott). The creation of identities in Ireland and Northern Ireland was the focus of the panels at the first drafting workshop. Scholars from history, sociological, English literature and law came together to discuss the effects of the social, geographical, political and religious contexts on the construction of Irish identities. One element of this identity creation was migration and more broadly, travel and movement. Louise Ryan argued that identity is relational; it is located within particular places and created by the different relations between people. She discussed the effect of migration to England on Irish identity, showing how the perception of Irish people in England effects the way individuals present their Irish-ness.

In particular, the panels were interested in the way more marginalised groups build identities or have identities imposed upon them. Throughout the workshop the term foreign was constantly conceptualised and reconceptualised, stretched and expanded, to include those groups of people who are considered ‘foreign’ because they do not fit within societies expectations. ‘Foreign’ could include migrants, religious identities, LGBT persons, or women. Marianne Elliot noted how the word for foreign and protestant in Irish is the same and Anne Mulhall from University College Dublin spoke on the representation of migrant and LGBT persons in campaign literature.

One of the questions that the project seeks to explore is the role of the judiciary in the creation of identities. In judicial decisions, identities are created and the case law acts as a permeant record of this identity. The McGimpsey v Ireland case is an interesting example of the way litigants are constructed by the courts. The McGimpsey brothers lived in Northern Ireland and were well-known political actors amongst unionist supporters, their political belief was a rejection of Irish jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. They took a case to the courts in the Republic of Ireland challenging the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Even though the brothers rejected Ireland’s territorial claims and unionists in general would have been disliked in the Republic, when the case was in the High Court in the Republic of Ireland, Barrington J described the litigants as being ‘patently sincere and serious people’. Emphasising the brothers’ good standing within the community and their public and civic lives, the court fashioned an ideal litigant. This raises the question whether a housewife could have brought the same case and received the same favourable treatment; a question that Aoife O’Donoghue considered in her feminist rewrite of the Irish Supreme Court judgment.

The interrelationship between questions of community and identity in Northern Ireland and Ireland is strong. The community in Northern Ireland meant Protestant and Catholic or Unionist and Nationalist. Marianne Elliot highlighted how these different community groups had very different oral histories, which are used to crystallise identities. The pervasiveness of this divide is seen by the nature of party politics, which draws a distinction between “unionist”, “nationalist” and “other”. Yet, Myrtle Hill, a historian at Queen’s University Belfast and Monica McWilliams from the Transitional Justice Institute, talked about and shared experiences of the women’s movement in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. They noted how the movement distanced itself from the political-party lines that were drawn and engaged in cross-community activism. More recently, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition created in 1996, also refused to align with one ideology and were designated as “other” within the Irish National Assembly.

Still, a reoccurring trend in the Northern Irish and Irish judgments was the construction of identity along political and sectarian lines, dividing the community into Protestants and Catholics or unionists and nationalists. In re White concerned the appointment of representatives to the Northern Ireland Parades Commission (overseeing the parades or marches that take place in Northern Ireland). Despite the fact that women took part in the parades and were affected by the parades that took place on their streets, in the original decision it was held that ‘representative of the community’ did not include representing women. Similarly, in the case of McGimpsey v Ireland the original judgment talks of majority and minority community (invoking the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority). There is no thought to those people who fell outside of these divides, in particular those people who were excluded by the community: in response to the 1978 draft Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order, the Democratic Unionist Party started a petition to “Save Ulster from Sodomy”.

The feminist judgments in the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project demonstrate how these decisions could have been decided or reasoned differently to improve the place of women and minorities within society. Each judge had a different feminism and so had different methods of creating a feminist judgment. By placing women within the text of the judgment, by focusing on the specific gendered nature of the harm suffered, by telling the stories of the women involved or in the cases of In re White and McGimpsey v Ireland by reconceptualising ‘community’, the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project is able to critique the original decisions. The Irish feminist judges are now challenging judicial decisions that had a negative effect on women and minority groups.

The Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project has been assisted by research from Zoe Carter and Eleanne Hussey (LSE) and Ellen Jepson from Gender and Law at DurhamThank you to the University of Ulster, Transitional Justice Institute and Law School for hosting and supporting the first workshop.

Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: First Workshop 'The Foreign Subject'

Isis, the Caliphate and new states

 _75935223_iraq_syria_isis_caliphate_20140630_624_v1The rapid advance of Isis, (The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham), its renaming of itself as “Islamic State” combined with the declaration of a Caliphate and added to recent statements made by the regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan around its potential future have brought questions as to the continued existence of Iraq and potentially, Syria, as states to the fore. In their statement declaring a Caliph, Isis have explicitly referred to the Sykes-Picot Pact (the division by the UK and France of former Ottoman Territories during the First World War, for a repudiation of the claim that the colonial period has some role to play, see here) as coming to an end. In doing so, Isis are making use of the coverage of the First World War anniversaries in the West (for example ceremonies this weekend on the 100th anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Serbia) questioning the aims of that war and the narrative of the so-called “democratic” states standing for freedom against the imperial powers at Europe’s centre but also the legitimacy of the present status of Iraq and Syria from their inception as states following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In doing so Isis are attempting to challenge the tenets of legitimacy under which statehood currently operate but perhaps in considering their own claims to statehood ought to consider whether the same tools that brought Syria and Iraq into fruition may be employed again. The broader question for international law is whether this question of statehood ought to rest on apparently ‘objective’ factors that have little to do with internal legitimacy or historical events and ought to be replaced with a normative, perhaps human rights framework, or whether the present state of law is preferable even with its apparent lack of normative code.

Their claim to legitimacy stems quite clearly from an interpretation of Islam that enables Isis to act as they have but within these arguments there is a clear narrative conforming to the traditional claims to statehood and are interesting when set alongside other contemporary debates such as Ukraine and Kosovo. Traditionally international law has not cared as to the internal character of a state and the existence of a theocracy is certainly no bar given the acceptance of the Vatican (Holy See) or Iran as states. Indeed, by the early 1980s most states had stopped recognising governments on the basis that state recognition was what was required for international law and the recognition of governments was a political decision. Recent actions by European states as well as the US and Russia regarding the Arab Spring or the Ukraine does open the possibility that this policy may have changed as the Cold War political exigencies that caused the initial change are no longer relevant. Thus Isis’ character as a government is no bar to statehood. Of course this is not to suggest that other elements of international law such as rights pertaining to women, minorities and freedom of thought or expression would not be violated but rather to clearly argue that this is not related to statehood as generally accepted within international law. EU states did require the former Yugoslav and USSR Republics to conform to human rights protection before recognising them but this has not been replicated with any uniformity since that period. The UN aims at universal membership and thus is highly unlikely it would bar Isis’ Islamic state from membership if it to be recognised as a state.

Statehood as outlined in the Montevideo Convention requires;

(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states

In their statement today Isis claimed to fill the first and second criteria by making a definite claim to territory and population that runs from ‘northern Syria to the Iraqi province of Diyala north-east of Baghdad.’ Of course a claim does not necessarily reflect reality. Large swathes of these territories have very sparse populations and certainly both Damascus and Baghdad would argue that these borders are contested even if they currently do not exercise firm control over them. While there are no temporal requirements for control of population or territory when these are combined with the other two elements of Montevideo some form of long-term governance does appear necessary. Governments, as already discussed, do not have to conform to any particular form but the normal activities of governance such as control of the use of force or the functioning of utilities combined with some of revenue collection would indicate a government in control. Currently it is unclear as to whether Isis would meet such a standard. The last criteria, the capacity to enter into relations with other states, does not actually require other states to do so just that this is possible. For Isis this criteria does appear lacking if social media is discounted. While of course the entire legitimacy of such criteria as Montevideo could be dismissed by Isis in all probability it is what will be applied by other states. One potential barrier may be the right to self-determination which would require some form of consultation with the populations that are controlled by Isis but in itself self-determination is not a right to statehood. Whether self-determination can put a bar on declaring statehood once the other criteria are satisfied is open to question and has not been resolved by a recent International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Kosovo which touched upon this issue.

In contrast to Isis, the Government in Kurdish Iraq appear far better placed to fulfill these criteria though the advance into Kirkuk makes at least some of its border disputable but also gives it a further source of revenue. Their current boundaries are defined, (even if they intend to make further claims in Turkey or Iran), there is a permanent population (albeit with a current influx of refugees), there is a government and this government has representatives in other states, although they are not currently at the status of ambassador. The non-recognition of a new Islamic State or a new Kurdish state does not necessarily mean either the continuation or disappearance of Iraq and Syria. The rump of either can continue, as Ukraine and the former Yugoslav states have clearly demonstrated. While Isis’ claims cause an existential threat to all states in the region the Kurdish question is more problematic for Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The malleability of state definitions leaves open a range of possibilities for those states potentially wishing to recognise the latter over the former but the broader issue of the legitimacy of governments remains a political query where states have to decide whether they are going to claim to have normative values, including human rights particularly with regard to women, or whether statehood will be the de minimus Montevideo requirement only for recognition.

New borders are possible as are new states. The recent up surge of territories claiming statehood (in Ukraine, in Georgia, within Russia, Kosovo, potentially Scotland or the Basque region) may slowly lead to a change in how we go about identifying new states that sets a clear break between the Montevideo criteria and what followed the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, but at present, the law appears devoid of any claim to require a government to be democratically elected, representative or that it grants any form of rights to its citizens.

Isis, the Caliphate and new states

Is Article 8 ECHR the ‘Feminist Article’?

indexWe are very pleased to welcome this guest post from Helen Fenwick who is Professor at Durham Law School. Helen is an expert in civil liberties, human rights and counter-terrorism law. She is also an expert advisor for Liberty and has been involved in policy development at national and international levels.  This post is also published at Inherently Human

This post concentrates on Article 8 ECHR to argue that it can be viewed as sympathetic to feminist goals since, due to its particular ability to impose positive obligations on the state in relation to creating respect for private or family life, it can require the state to create curbs on the actions of non-state actors particularly adverse to women (eg. in relation to domestic violence: Hajduova v Slovakia) and ensure the efficacy of services that women in particular might need to access, such as to abortion (P&S v Poland). Women are, it is argued, more at risk than men from the actions of non-state actors within the private and family sphere (see intervention of Equal Rights Trust in Eremia and Others v Moldova on this point), so Article 8 has a particular pertinence for women, and unlike Article 14 (the guarantee of freedom from discrimination), which has not proved to have a strong impact as a means of advancing the interests of women due to its reliance on furthering formal equality (see eg Dembour Who Believes in Human Rights, Ch 7), Article 8 can address the substantive concerns of women, without the need for any reliance on a comparator.

Other ECHR Articles are also relevant. Article 3 would also support recognition of positive obligations, (see McGlynn, Clare (2009) ‘Rape, torture and the European convention on human rights’ ICLQ 58 (3)) including in the contexts considered below, although the harm threshold is obviously high. Article 8 currently may be the gateway to Article 14, the freedom from discrimination guarantee (bearing in mind that the UK has not ratified Protocol 12). In other words, if Article 8 is engaged but no violation is found, a violation of Article 14 might nevertheless be found of the two read together (Van Raalte v Netherlands).

Using Article 8 ECHR to advance women’s interests

Under one strand of feminist thinking, it might be argued that the ECHR in general has little to offer women (see, for discussion, Grabham and Hunter ‘Encountering Human Rights’). This is due to a judicial approach to it that values modes of thought that may marginalise women and which pays little attention to ideas about feminist legal method (see Samuels ‘Feminizing  human rights adjudication’), combined with the difficulty of using specific cases to address complex social problems. But, as a number of writers have pointed out, especially recently (see Bauer, ‘Documenting women’s rights violations by non-state actors’), human rights principles can be used as a campaign tool in influencing and mobilising public and community opinion. The use of campaigning methods by feminist advocacy groups, as instanced in the recent successful campaign to remove gender-based hate speech from Facebook, does not preclude mobilising legal channels as a complementary means of disrupting existing social norms adverse to women via deployment of such principles, allowing gender-specific variants of rights’ violations to be recognised. At the same time, the difficulties facing women who seek to use the ECHR should not be under-stated, and Article 8’s protection for family life is gender neutral at face value, meaning that it can also be invoked in ways that could put women and girls at risk by discouraging state actions interfering with family life that are designed to protect vulnerable women (for example, claims by family members convicted of offences relating to domestic violence, including ‘honour’ murder, that post-sentence they should not be deprived of access to surviving family members in furtherance of their family life, as occurred, albeit unsuccessfully, in Ahmad v Brent).

So, in what ways does and could Art 8 especially benefit women and girls?  This blog obviously cannot offer by any means an exhaustive list – each of these matters is complex and has already spawned quite an extensive literature in itself in relation to international human rights’ law – so they can only be touched on here.

Preventing deportation to face adverse treatment based on gender

EM (Lebanon) (FC) (Appellant) (FC) v SSHD concerned a woman who had suffered domestic violence from her husband; as Lord Bingham noted, he had ended her first pregnancy by hitting her on the stomach with a heavy vase, saying he did not want children (para 22). Under Shari’a law as applied in Lebanon, during the first seven years of life, when a male child is cared for by the mother, the father retains legal custody and may decide where the child lives. The transfer to the father at age 7 is automatic: the court has no discretion in the matter and is unable to consider whether the transfer is in the best interests of the child. As a result, Lord Bingham pointed out, women are often constrained to remain in abusive marriages for fear of losing their children (para 24). The evidence was that no family life had been established in Lebanon between the child and his father or his father’s family; it was found that the father had shown no interest in him. The applicant had managed to leave Lebanon with her son and resisted deportation from the UK on the basis of her Article 8 right to respect for family life; as this was a ‘foreign’ case, she had to show that a flagrant violation of Article 8 would arise due to the impact on her family life if she was returned to Lebanon, taking into account that the only family life that had been established was between mother and son. The Lords agreed that on return to Lebanon both the appellant’s and her son’s right to respect for their family life would be flagrantly violated in the sense of being ‘completely denied and nullified’.

Expulsion to face the risk of extremely serious adverse treatment on grounds of gender – ‘honour’ murder (see A.A and others v Sweden) or FGM (Omeredo v Austria) – has been found to fall within Articles 2 or 3. But their status as unqualified or non-materially qualified rights inevitably carries with it the need to show a high threshold of harm, and so places women under serious evidential difficulties, meaning that bringing the claim also under Article 8 (alone and/or combined with Article 14) may be advantageous in such instances.

 Domestic violence – requirement of effective investigations and prevention

 Bevacqva and S v Bulgaria concerned a woman who had been attacked on a number of occasions by her husband and claimed that her requests for a criminal prosecution were rejected on the ground that it was a ‘private matter’. The Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the failure of the state to adopt the measures necessary to punish and control the violent behaviour of her husband. A somewhat similar situation arose in Hajduova v Slovakia; the applicant’s husband had been detained in hospital for psychiatric treatment after he attacked her in public and threatened to kill her. She moved to a refuge with her children. Her ex-husband was released, without having undergone the required treatment, and renewed his threats. Reiterating that Slovakia has a duty to protect the physical and psychological integrity of individuals, particularly vulnerable victims of domestic violence, the Court found a violation of Article 8 in that, although the applicant’s ex-husband had not assaulted her following his release from hospital, her fear that his threats might be carried out was well-founded and the authorities had failed in their duty to ensure his detention for psychiatric treatment. A similar outcome was reached in Kalucza v. Hungary, which concerned Hungary’s failure to protect Ms Kalucza from her violent former partner. The Court found a violation of Article 8 since the Hungarian authorities had not taken sufficient measures to provide her with effective protection against him, despite criminal complaints lodged against him for assault, repeated requests for a restraining order against him, and civil proceedings to order his eviction from their flat.

These cases succeeded under Article 8, although it is readily arguable that some cases of domestic violence should rather raise issues under Articles 2 and 3, as in Opuz v Turkey which concerned the ‘honour’ murder of the applicant’s mother, who had tried to support the applicant, and repeated ‘honour’ crimes in the form of serious assaults and death threats against the applicant. The Court noted that the national authorities were reluctant to interfere in what they perceived to be a “family matter”. Turkey was found to have violated Article 2 due to its lack of due diligence in taking preventive operational measures to protect the life of the mother and, therefore, in failing in their positive obligation to protect the right to life of the applicant’s mother within the meaning of Article 2. Turkey was also found to have violated Article 3 due to its failure to take protective measures in the form of effective deterrence against serious breaches of the applicant’s personal integrity by her husband.

A number of highly significant findings were made in this context in the very recent case of Eremia and Others v Moldova. The judgment found that, while the authorities took some steps to protect the first applicant from her violent husband, a police officer, over a period of time, the steps were not effective and there was reluctance to take the matter seriously enough. In other words, the failures in the case were redolent of the familiar failings in the previous domestic violence cases considered. But not only were breaches of Articles 8 and 3 (on the basis of the state’s positive obligation to protect persons from inhuman treatment) found, but the Equal Rights Trust, intervening, persuaded the Court to treat domestic violence as a form of gender-based discrimination under Article 14 read with Article 3.  The second and third applicants were the daughters of the first applicant; they complained successfully under Article 8 of the psychological effects of witnessing their mother being physically and verbally abused at their home, while being unable to help, and of verbal abuse on the part of A. The decision represents an important breakthrough in this jurisprudence since the gendered nature of domestic violence – its disproportionate and particular impact on women – was recognised under Article 14, as was the impact of such violence on children forced to witness it, under Article 8.

 Recently in the UK, the IPCC reported adversely on the police investigation into the murder of Maria Stubbings who was strangled in Chelmsford, Essex, in December 2008 by her former boyfriend, Marc Chivers. Essex police knew he had killed before, and that he had served time in prison for assaulting Stubbings, but the IPCC found that they had failed to recognise the seriousness of the danger to her. As a number of journalists have recently pointed out, the Macpherson inquiry found that the police had failed “to provide an appropriate and professional service” with “processes, attitudes and behaviour” harmful to the minority ethnic community when it reported on the murder of Stephen Lawrence. Maria Stubbings’ family have called for a similar inquiry into failings in police investigations into domestic violence. The threat and actuality of a possible action under Articles 8, 2, and 3 domestically or at Strasbourg, based on the jurisprudence cited, would be likely to aid campaigns focussing on this issue.

Upholding access to abortion

The recent jurisprudence on abortion at Strasbourg has had some moderate success in alleviating harm to women, by invoking Article 8 (and in some instances Article 3 in RR v Poland and P&S v Poland). The claims so far have been brought against Poland and Ireland (ABC, RR and P&S), but cases against other states are in the Strasbourg system (for example, Z v Moldova). This is not the place to discuss this developing jurisprudence in detail, except to make two points. Poland purports to allow abortion in certain narrow circumstances but, in practice, on religious grounds, places obstacles in the way of obtaining it (RR para 84-86), while Ireland has a virtual prohibition with a narrow exception where there is a serious risk to the life of mother. The suffering of the applicants, especially in the Polish cases so far, has tended to be of a very serious nature (see, eg. Tysiac v Poland, where a complication with pregnancy resulted in blindness). Although Ireland’s current virtual complete prohibition on domestic abortion is largely ineffective due to the availability of abortion in England (ABC), it has been linked to extreme suffering in exceptional circumstances, including the tragic death of Savita Halappanavar. This position underpins the paradox of the current jurisprudence which is that cases against Poland are more likely to succeed despite its more liberal regime, since the Court can avoid a full confrontation with Ireland’s Constitutional provision of equal protection for foetal and maternal life.

The recent case of P&S v Poland, the first Strasbourg case on rape-induced pregnancy, graphically illustrates what is wrong with Polish practice on abortion. The first applicant, P, was a 14 year old girl who became pregnant as a result of rape. She therefore had a legal right to an abortion under Polish law. However, when, supported by her mother, S, she sought to access an abortion in practice, she faced a range of obstructions. The hospital that P approached disclosed her personal and medical information to the media, and the public generally. As a result, she was harassed by anti-abortion activists and representatives of the Catholic Church. She went to three different hospitals but could not obtain genuine information about the requirements for obtaining an abortion. Doctors invoked conscientious objection against performing the abortion and failed to refer P to another hospital. The stance was taken by anti-abortion hospital staff and Church officials, falsely, that S was trying to pressure P into having an abortion against her will. As a result, when P and S sought police protection from anti-abortion activists, the police instead arrested P, removed her from S’s custody and placed her in detention (paras 17, 26, 28 and 29). After delays, P eventually received a legal abortion following an intervention from the Ministry of Health, but she received no post-abortion care (para 41). The Court relied on Tysiąc and RR to reaffirm under Article 8 that once a State has adopted statutory regulations that allow abortion in specified situations, it comes under a duty to make the access available in practice. The Court found a breach of Article 8 on the basis of ‘a striking discordance between the theoretical right to… an abortion…and the reality of its practical implementation’ (para 111).

The situation in Poland may appear to be far removed from that in the UK (apart from in Northern Ireland), but given current attempts to undermine the principle of safe legal abortion by making access to abortion more difficult – in particular by allowing pro-life groups to become involved in counselling abortion-seekers (proposed by Nadine Dorries) and greater protection for conscientious objection (confirmed in a recent case involving Catholic midwives).


This blog has suggested that the guarantee of respect for private and family life under Article 8, taking account of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, is leading to developments in human rights principles that reduce gender-based harm to women. A pervasive pessimism in some feminist thinking on the potential of the ECHR to address and reduce such harm may have obscured the potential of such developments, which are also very recent. This blog suggests that a pessimistic view of the ECHR’s potential (and Article 8’s in particular) to aid women who have been let down by courts and legislatures in their own states, should be revisited.

Is Article 8 ECHR the ‘Feminist Article’?

The Rationales for Development for Women and the Urban Poor

Two events earlier this month have put global development at the forefront of the Government’s Irish Aid programme’s objectives for 2013. First, the Department of Foreign Affairs co-hosted, with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a forum on Women entrepreneurs in Developing Countries. This was followed by a forum on global poverty with the World Alliance of Cities against Poverty. Naturally, placing socio-economic rights at the forefront of aid and development discussions should be expected to be at the core of these events, however, far too often and increasingly of late, such debates and programmes have become overshadowed and, perhaps, even hijacked by liberal economic concerns. Such economics concerns increasingly appear to possess more weight and often better articulated than a rights based approach or development as a good in itself to be fulfilled. The focus on women and the urban poor is to be welcomed in both instances, yet the conscious effort to phrase these attempts to bring about substantive change in an economic rather than in a rights/dignity setting is a matter of increasing concern.

The first event, centred on access to education and reproductive health, both also Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Continue reading “The Rationales for Development for Women and the Urban Poor”

The Rationales for Development for Women and the Urban Poor

Families Against Forced Divorce

Families Against Forced Divorce: To protect the privacy of our children and our spouses, we feel we are unable to publicly put our names to this article.

In a country where divorce was illegal twenty years ago, is it about to be made compulsory for some?  Imagine being told that the State will not legally recognise your identity unless you first divorce your husband or wife.  This is not some nightmare scenario from the Nazi 1930s.  It’s all too real and about to be inflicted on transgender families in Ireland today.

Ireland remains the last of the 27 EU Nations which still does not allow Gender Recognition for transgender people. This lack of legal recognition of our true gender has many important implications for our lives.  First and foremost is the lack of being respected and protected in Irish law in our true gender which impacts on every corner of our lives.

Without such protection, difficulties can arise in our jobs, pensions, insurance, foreign travel and even our ability to engage in most sporting activities to the point that we simply cannot participate at all.  For example, to play ladies golf you must be recognised by the State as a woman.  Or, what do you think your chances of getting a job would be if you are “outed” as a transgender person in the process?  Only with full Gender Recognition can we hope to move on with our lives.

Marriages where one spouse is transgender are lucky to survive.  Let us look at one example: Sandra and Michelle.  Sandra suffered from Gender Identity Disorder and always felt female despite the fact that she had a functioning male body.

At the time Sandra married Michelle in 1990, she was endeavouring to be the “man” that society expected her to be.  Their marriage is fully valid Continue reading “Families Against Forced Divorce”

Families Against Forced Divorce

5th Anniversary of decision in Foy v An tArd Chlaraitheoir (No 2) [2007] IEHC 470

Human Rights in Ireland is pleased to host a blog carnival reflecting on the 5th anniversary of the decision in Foy (No 2). This blog carnival is organised by Dr Tanya Ní Mhuirthile. Tanya is a Senior Lecturer at Griffith College Dublin, is on the board of Transgender Equality Network Ireland and is a legal consultant to InterseXUK.

Five years ago today, Mr Justice McKechnie handed down his decision in Foy (No 2) in which he announced his intention to issue the first ever Declaration of Incompatibility under s5 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. The source of the incompatibility was the inability of Irish law to recognise the preferred gender identity of Dr Foy in contravention to the right to respect for one’s private life as contained in Article 8 ECHR.

Five years later, the incompatibility remains.

The Government has commissioned and published the report of the Gender Recognition Advisory Group (GRAG), and proposed legislation entitled the Gender Recognition Bill is on the ‘C’ list of the Legislative Programme for 2012 – meaning the heads of bill have yet to be approved by the Government. Nothing substantial has changed. As Mr Justice McKechnie noted in his judgment five years ago within a year of the decision in Goodwin v UK (2002) the House of Lords, issued a similar declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act , 1998 in Bellinger v Bellinger [2003]. The following year the UK’s Gender Recognition Act 2004 had been passed. Thus Justice McKechnie noted: ‘Ireland, as of now, must be even further disconnected from Continue reading “5th Anniversary of decision in Foy v An tArd Chlaraitheoir (No 2) [2007] IEHC 470”

5th Anniversary of decision in Foy v An tArd Chlaraitheoir (No 2) [2007] IEHC 470

Gender quotas and freedom of association

It was announced last week that amidst concerns surrounding the low participation of women in Irish politics, the Government intends to introduce legislation requiring political parties to field a minimum quota of 30% of female candidates for elections. This requirement will be enforced through an unusual administrative sanction. Parties failing to meet this target would, it is proposed, lose a portion of the public funding available under the Electoral Acts. The “quota” will rise to 40% after the next general election.

It is not my intention, in this post, to consider the various policy arguments surrounding the necessity or efficacy of the proposed measure. Instead, I simply intend to consider whether, if implemented, it would likely encounter any constitutional difficulty, and the chances of success of any political party or prospective individual candidates who might challenge the constitutional validity of the relevant legislation. As will be outlined, the constitutionality of the proposed measure depends on how the purpose and political-moral quality of the freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution are interpreted.

Continue reading “Gender quotas and freedom of association”

Gender quotas and freedom of association

Guest Post: Louise Hannon at the Equality Tribunal.

We are pleased to welcome this guest post from Tanya ni Mhuirthile of the Faculty of Law, UCC. Tanya is a member of the Board of Directors of the Transgender Equality Network Ireland.

The recent decision of the Equality Tribunal that discrimination on the basis of gender identity amounts to a breach of rights under the Employment Equality Acts is to be welcomed. It represents a huge step forward in terms of protection for those who have questioned their gender at birth.

Continue reading “Guest Post: Louise Hannon at the Equality Tribunal.”

Guest Post: Louise Hannon at the Equality Tribunal.

Brief Feminist Notes on Budget 2011

Recession affects men and women, but not always in the same ways or to the same degree. Often, the effects of recession on women as a class are more severe than the effects of recession on men. When governments enact policies which fail to take account of how the ‘pain’ of economic collapse is distributed across gender lines, they may reinforce rather than alleviate these specific burdens. ‘We’ are not in this ‘together’. Women, by and large, are in deeper. These aren’t especially controversial claims. Some of the supporting arguments I might make I made last year here and others are well outlined in the NWCI’s 2011 Pre-Budget Submission. For more in-depth research on gender and the global recession see herehere and see these papers from the Feminist Open Forum conference in March. Before I go any further I want to answer a question that some of you may already be thinking of: ‘What about men?’

Continue reading “Brief Feminist Notes on Budget 2011”

Brief Feminist Notes on Budget 2011