Like many others, I have been thinking about and discussing Miller (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union  EWHC 2768) with colleagues today. This is the decision from the High Court that the Government cannot trigger Article 50 in order to begin the process of withdrawal from the EU without getting Parliamentary authorisation first.
Put very shortly (and without wanting to get too far into the details of the reasoning per se), this is because the Court found that, as a constitutional statute and one that created domestic rights and anchored EU rights, the European Communities Act 1972 could not be turned to naught by the Executive. The prerogative power had been constrained by this Act, and it was not within the royal prerogative to make even international treaty decisions (such as withdrawing from the EU) that would disturb this domestic statute. In other words, parliamentary authorisation is required before Article 50 is triggered and the formal process of leaving the EU can begin.
There are already, and will in the coming days, be lots of analyses on the reasoning per se from a constitutional law perspective (see, for example, the reflections of Paul Daly, Kenneth Armstrong and Aileen McHarg). My purpose here is to offer a few reflections more broadly on the implications of the judgment, especially for those more interested in its practical meaning for Brexit than in its (unquestioned) broad constitutional significance per se. Continue reading “The Practical Implications of Miller v SSEEU for Brexit: Nine Reflections”